Engaging Citizens: The Role of Power-Sharing Institutions

Miki Caul Kittilson  Arizona State University
Leslie Schwindt-Bayer  University of Missouri

Drawing on established theories of comparative political institutions, we argue that democratic institutions carry important messages that influence mass attitudes and behaviors. Power-sharing political institutions signal to citizens that inclusiveness is an important principle of a country’s democracy and can encourage citizens to participate in politics. Applying multilevel modeling to data from the World Values Survey, we test whether democratic institutions influence political engagement in 34 countries. Further, we examine whether under-represented groups, specifically women, are differentially affected by the use of power-sharing institutions such that they are more engaged in politics than women in countries with power-concentrating institutions. We find that disproportional electoral rules dampen engagement overall and that gender gaps in political engagement tend to be smaller in more proportional electoral systems, even after controlling for a host of other factors. Power-sharing institutions can be critical for explaining gender differences in political engagement.

How do political institutions condition individual citizens’ orientations toward politics? The importance of institutions for politics has been well established, and is grounded in pioneering studies by William Riker (1980) and Douglass North (1990). Although a burgeoning literature has focused on the ways in which political institutions condition individual attributes, such as party support in shaping political engagement (see Anderson and Singer 2008 for a review), less attention has been paid to the role of institutions in encouraging political equality, especially among men and women. Equality in political engagement poses an enduring challenge for democracies around the world.

We theorize that political institutions do more than afford rational incentives for participation but also symbolize a country’s most important ideals for the democratic process. We argue that to more fully explain political attitudes and behavior we must also consider the ideational effects of political institutions. Drawing on established theories of democratic institutions, we argue that institutions act as symbols and send signals to citizens about the importance of inclusiveness to the democratic process. Where institutions promote power sharing, citizens will be more likely to engage in the political process. This effect should be particularly strong for women because they have traditionally been excluded from the political process in much larger numbers than men.

We use data from the 2000–2002 World Values Survey to test the viability of this theory. Drawing on Norris’ (2008) operationalization of power-sharing institutions, we examine whether the electoral system, type of executive, and unitary or federal states influence citizens’ political engagement. Further, we test whether these institutions have a stronger effect on women’s engagement than men’s engagement and generate greater equality in women’s and men’s political engagement. We run multilevel models with approximately 1,000 respondents in each of 34 countries from around the world. Our findings reveal that some power-sharing institutions do affect political engagement, and more specifically, yield smaller gender gaps in political engagement than exist in countries with power-concentrating institutions.1 The symbolic messages that institutions carry should not be overlooked in future efforts to understand mass attitudes and behavior.

1An online appendix for this article is available at http://journals.cambridge.org/jop containing the description of variables and descriptive statistics for political institutions for the countries in this dataset. Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results will be made available on publication: http://web.missouri.edu/~schwindtbayerl/pubs-prja.htm.
Political Institutions and Visions of Democracy

Prominent theories envision two major categories of democratic systems—power sharing and power concentrating (Norris 2008). While Arend Lijphart (1999) uses the terms consensus and majoritarian, and Bingham Powell (2000) employs the terms proportional and majoritarian visions of democracy, these conceptualizations capture similar distinctions in the distribution of power created by political institutions. Power-sharing systems are steeped in democratic ideals such as inclusion and broad representation and aim to generate governments that are representative of a wide array of interests. Power-concentrating systems prioritize the rule of the majority and a concomitant concentration of power in the hands of a few political actors and are designed to generate efficient, accountable majority rule (Lijphart 1984, 1999; Powell 2000). The two visions of political systems reflect the fact that “democracies are structured differently to allow for different relationships between majorities and minorities” (Anderson et al. 2005, 30). Because power-sharing systems aim for broad participation in government, they often employ institutions such as proportional representation (PR), parliamentarism, and federalism (Norris 2008). In contrast, power-concentrating democracies rely on single-member district plurality electoral rules, zero-sum presidential elections, and unitary government.

These two visions of democracy have been used to explain a wide range of political outcomes. Lijphart (1999) contends that power-sharing democracies are associated with “kinder, gentler” policies, such as foreign aid, environmental protection, and more women in the legislature. Similarly, Powell (2000) argues that power-sharing democracies produce more representative governments promoting greater policy congruence between government and citizens. Others have examined the effects of these institutions on mass attitudes. Citizens in power-sharing democracies have been found to display greater satisfaction with democracy than citizens in majoritarian democracies (Klingemann 1999; Lijphart 1999). Similarly, power-sharing institutions create greater support for the legislature among men and women than their majoritarian counterparts (Norris 1999; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). Anderson and Guillory (1997) find that power-sharing systems ameliorate differences in democratic satisfaction between winners and losers. Similarly, Wells and Kriekhaus (2006) stress the importance of power-sharing institutions for democratic satisfaction while downplaying the influence of economic growth, corruption, democratic longevity, and political freedoms. In a study of a broad range of attitudes towards democracy, Christopher Anderson and colleagues (2005) link power-sharing democratic designs to a narrower gap between winners and losers for evaluations of performance of the political system, responsiveness, fairness, and support for democratic principles overall. And these effects are both immediate and lasting.

Although no research theorizes a symbolic effect of institutions on mass behavior, some scholars link electoral institutions to political participation with explanations that are grounded in rational actor theory (Anderson and Singer 2008). Seminal research on voter participation, for example, finds empirical support for a relationship between proportionality and higher turnout (Boix 2003; Jackman 1987; Powell 1986). This relationship is theorized to be rooted in potential voters perceiving fewer “wasted votes” for smaller parties in proportional representation systems and thus having greater incentive to show up at the polls. Because proportional systems provide more opportunity for representation, scholars of comparative politics long assumed they fostered participation. Testing these expectations, Karp and Banducci (2008a) find that proportionality enhances voter participation by fostering stronger party preferences and efficacy.

Duverger’s (1955) seminal theory of the effect of electoral rules on voting links single-member plurality rules to two party systems through two mechanisms, one mechanical and the other psychological. The mechanical effect follows from parties that place third or lower usually being underrepresented in their share of seats. The psychological effect occurs as voters anticipate the consequences of these rules for parties, expect their votes for third parties to be “wasted,” and vote for one of the two largest parties instead. Most research that links institutions to mass behavior focuses on the fact that the mechanical and psychological effects of institutions provide incentives for rational actors to behave in certain ways. Importantly, however, the psychological effects of institutions extend beyond this. Political institutions also work to socialize citizens into the dominant norms of a country’s democracy (Eckstein 1988). Regime norms such as majority rule act as political symbols, which can have both cognitive and evaluative effects (Cobb and Elder 1973, cited in Conover and Feldman 1981). Our theory emphasizes the affective effects encouraged by institutions as symbols.

Our theoretical framework builds on the psychological effects of institutions and argues that institutions are symbols that embody ideals for the
democratic process and shape citizen attitudes and behavior by providing cues for citizens about those ideals. Citizens learn about these ideals and norms through national elections. In this study, we focus on the different ideals and values embodied by power-sharing institutions versus power-concentrating institutions and the effect they have on citizens’ political engagement. Powell (2000) and Lijphart (1999) theorize that power-sharing systems operate on norms and ideals of inclusiveness, broad representation, and the distribution of power while power-concentrating systems are built upon and offer ideas about the importance of majority government for effective decision making. We argue that these different ideals affect citizens’ engagement. Power-sharing institutions send signals of inclusiveness to citizens, generating greater political engagement. In contrast, power-concentrating institutions may generate perceptions of exclusion and deter involvement.

### Gender and Political Engagement

Gender inequality in political engagement pervades many countries. It has been found in many forms of engagement, such as political interest, political knowledge, campaign involvement, attempts to persuade others, democratic satisfaction, and casting a ballot, and exists both in the United States and around the world (Beckwith 1986; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Christy 1987; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Karp and Banducci 2008b; Norris 2007; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). At the national level, dominant explanations for gender gaps rest upon socioeconomic development. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2003) argue that perceptions of appropriate roles for women and men in politics are shaped by broader patterns of societal values and priorities, which in turn, rest on economic development and religious traditions. More economically developed and secular countries are associated with more egalitarian gender attitudes. Given the speed of secularization in Europe and other democracies since the 1970s, one might suspect religion plays a smaller role among contemporary electorates.

Explanations for gender differences in political engagement also focus on socioeconomic factors at the individual level (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Socioeconomic resources provide skills and information that can subsidize the costs of participation. Studies have found that women’s disadvantages related to education and income go a long way in explaining their lower levels of political participation as well as the types of jobs they are likely to hold and the types of groups in which they often participate (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001).

Socioeconomic influences are certainly important to understanding gender differences in democratic engagement. Women’s levels of education and workforce participation have increased in many established democracies and the international women’s movement has made great strides ingratiating gender inequality into some very women-hostile cultures. Yet, gender differences in political engagement stubbornly endure in most countries anyway. Existing resource-based explanations for gender differences in political engagement have been unable to fully account for the cross-national variation in men’s and women’s political involvement.

One alternative approach to explaining the lingering gender gaps in political engagement has been to take into account the broader political context by examining how increased numbers of women elected to political office affects men’s and women’s engagement in politics. Greater representation of women in office is theorized to have symbolic effects for citizens, sending signals to them that women’s participation is welcome. Burns, Schlozman, and Verba state that women’s orientations toward the political arena are, “related to the implicit message transmitted to women by the dearth of women in the most visible and powerful political positions in the United States: ‘Politics is not my world’” (2001, 340).

However, the empirical evidence to support this theory of elected women as symbols of inclusion is mixed. The bulk of this research has focused on American elections. One set of studies in the United States finds considerable evidence that increasing women’s representation has symbolic effects on the masses. Together, both Burns, Schlozman, and Verba’s (2001) and High-Pippert and Comer’s (1998) analyses reveal that women residing in states with more women in visible political offices are significantly more likely to be politically informed, interested and efficacious than their counterparts in states with fewer elected women. Further, these effects are not evident among men. In the 1992 election, Sapiro and Conover (1997) find that women in states or districts with women candidates showed greater engagement than their counterparts living in areas with only male candidates. In state-level elected office, women’s presence heightens external efficacy among women in the electorate (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007). Similarly, Campbell and Wolbrecht (2006) highlight the importance of women politicians’ visibility in the news media for empowering women’s participation.
A rival set of studies finds little support for the role of women’s numerical representation in bolstering political engagement in the United States. Controlling for party congruence between representative and constituent, both Lawless (2004) and Dolan (2006) find little evidence that women in office encourage political efficacy or activity among women. Dolan’s (2006) study is unique in that it provides a long-term perspective on elections from 1990 to 2004, and her findings suggest that any relationship between women in office and engagement may be sensitive to the context of a given election.

In comparative politics, only a few studies have addressed the relationship between women’s representation and political engagement. Drawing on surveys of European adolescents, Wolbrecht and Campbell (2007) find that differences in intentions to participate among boys and girls narrow in countries with more women in office. Women’s representation has a symbolic effect where female politicians serve as role models inspiring young women to become active in politics. Similarly, in Latin America the gender gap in political participation is narrower in countries that have more women among political elites (Desposato and Norrander 2008). In contrast, however, Karp and Banducci’s (2008b) study of 29 developing and developed democracies offers little support for a symbolic impact of women in office on mass participation.

Inconsistent findings on the effect that women’s presence in office has for political participation suggests that something different, but perhaps related to women’s election, may help to explain gender differences in citizens’ political involvement. We argue that one integral factor is democratic institutions. Institutions can act as powerful symbols that send signals to citizens that encourage greater participation. While institutions are instrumental in facilitating or hindering women’s access to elective office around the world (Duverger 1955; Norris 1985; Paxton and Hughes 2007; Rule 1981, 1987; Reynolds 1999), they also may directly affect citizens’ political behavior. This relationship has heretofore been overlooked in explaining gendered dynamics of mass political behavior.

**Gender, Institutions, and Political Engagement**

Our primary research question is how political institutions influence political engagement. We argue that the signals of representativeness and inclusion that power-sharing institutions send to citizens are as fundamental as the actual numbers of women in office. Institutions very well may have mechanical effects on engagement by increasing representation of diverse groups, but we suggest that they also serve as political symbols and can have psychological effects on citizens’ political engagement regardless of whether greater diversity in representation actually results. Building on this theory, we have two primary hypotheses. First, we expect that power-sharing institutions will lead to higher levels of political engagement among citizens, regardless of gender. Second, we expect that power-sharing institutions will have an interactive effect with the gender of citizens such that institutions should have a larger effect on women’s engagement than men’s. We draw on Norris’s (2008) conceptualization of power-sharing versus power-concentrating institutions, which focuses on three institutions: the electoral system, type of executive, and whether a state is unitary or federal. The first of these three emphasizes electoral power-sharing institutions while the latter two emphasize the distribution of power in the political system, more broadly. Given this distinction, we expect the symbolic effects of each institution to work through different mechanisms.

According to Norris (2008), the most important power-sharing institution is the electoral system because of its potential implications for the party system, the degree of representativeness within legislatures, and the composition of governments. Proportionality in electoral rules increases choices for voters on Election Day, leads to greater representation of small parties and underrepresented groups, and facilitates the forming of coalition governments, while majoritarian rules restrict these things. Over the years, proportional representation electoral systems have become symbols of power sharing and have

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2 Most past research relies on Lijphart’s index of consensus government (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Wells and Krieschhaus 2006). However, reliance on indices obscures our understanding of how different institutions influence engagement among different groups as some institutions may matter more for some groups than others. Both Lijphart (1984, 1999) and Norris (2008) focused on the implications of institutional arrangements for ethnic minorities. We want to see how different institutions affect men’s and women’s engagement. Norris (2008) also includes a measure of freedom of the press. We do not utilize this measure for several reasons. First, it is the only measure of power sharing that does not overlap with Lijphart (1999) and Powell (2000). Second, a free press is less of a formal institution and more a norm. While the relationship between norms and civic engagement is a potentially fruitful area for future research, it may introduce endogeneity problems into the research at hand.
been adopted by governments wanting to emphasize representativeness, political inclusion, and consensus government (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). Because more proportional electoral rules carry messages of power sharing, they may send signals to citizens that encourage them to get engaged in the political process. Thus, citizen engagement should be higher in political systems that employ more proportional electoral rules.

In addition to its effects on the electorate, in general, we also expect the proportionality of the electoral system to be a particularly salient institutional influence on women’s engagement. Women have long been excluded from the political process. In nearly all democracies, they were enfranchised much later than most men, and even after winning the right to vote and run for office, they continued to be marginalized socially and politically. In the 1960s and 1970s, women’s movements emerged in many democracies, bringing ideologically diverse women together through a common call for greater gender equality in both social and political life (Gelb 1989; Jenson 1995; Stetson and Mazur 1995). As a result, women in many countries have developed a common social group identity rooted in their shared histories of marginalization (Mansbridge 1999). Electoral rules that emphasize proportional representation over majoritarianism send signals that the long-standing, male-dominated political environment is open to representation and inclusion of women, among other groups. These are signals that should affect women disproportionately more than men because most men have not been politically excluded or socially marginalized. Even if women have not yet made their way into high levels of political power, the use of electoral institutions that symbolize power sharing among diverse social groups can send signals to women in society that encourage them to get more engaged in politics. Consequently, countries that use more proportional electoral rules should have higher levels of women’s engagement in the political process.

Norris also argues that parliamentary systems are power-sharing institutions. She classifies them as such because they provide opportunities for “checks and balances on political leaders,” cabinet accountability to the legislature, “flexibility in the prime minister’s tenure,” and “incentives for cooperation and consultation between the executive and legislature” that “promote accommodation and compromise” (2008, 155–56). Parliamentary systems emphasize shared governance, and in doing so, serve as symbols of more inclusive government and can send signals to citizens that will encourage greater engagement in politics. In addition to boosting overall engagement of citizens, parliamentary systems may also have disproportionately strong effects for women. Because of their historically marginalized political status, women may perceive the balance of power between government institutions as a particularly strong cue that politics is more consensual and less of a zero-sum game because the political process is open to all citizens, not just the more powerful majority. In addition, an environment that promotes “accommodation and compromise” may appear much more suitable to women’s political engagement than one that is based on majority rule and competition (Norris 2008, 156). For these reasons, parliamentarism may spur women’s engagement to a larger degree than men’s.

Finally, Norris (2008) considers the geographical distribution of power (federal or unitary government) as a power-sharing institution. While proportionality symbolizes power sharing among social groups and parliamentarism symbolizes horizontal power sharing between branches of government, federalism symbolizes geographic or vertical power sharing. Federal systems disperse power to subnational governments, while unitary governments concentrate power. By distributing power to the local level and providing an alternative access point for citizens to interact with government, federal systems symbolize greater inclusiveness than do unitary systems. This may encourage greater citizen engagement in politics. Federalism also may have an amplified effect on women’s political engagement, relative to men’s. Because federalism devolves political power to the state and local levels, it symbolizes inclusiveness at a more local level and can send signals to women at that level, encouraging their engagement. Women may more strongly perceive these signals given their historic marginalization from politics, both at the local and national levels.

Taken together, we expect each of these power-sharing institutions to boost political engagement generally and also produce more pronounced effects for women, relative to men. Yet, each institution carries messages about power sharing in different ways: proportional electoral rules symbolize social group inclusion, parliamentary systems symbolize power sharing across branches of government, and federalism symbolizes geographic power sharing. We argue that it is necessary to examine each institution’s effect on citizen engagement separately to determine which power-sharing institutions provide the strongest signals for citizen engagement. This allows us to determine whether the participatory cues sent by
power-sharing institutions rely only on one mechanism or whether the link applies to all power-sharing institutions.

Data, Measurement, and Multilevel Modeling

We use data from the 2000–2002 version of the World Values Survey (WVS) to test these hypotheses about power-sharing institutions and political engagement. Political engagement is commonly defined as “psychological orientations toward politics” and is distinct from political activity (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 2001, 335). Instead, engagement is a critical predictor of actual participation (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997), and as such, must be studied separately from electoral participation. Because our theory is based on the symbolic cues disseminated by political institutions, we test their implications for engagement rather than for electoral activity. We use three measures of political engagement: interest in politics, discussing politics with friends, and following politics in the news.

These three measures capture distinct, but related, dimensions of political engagement. Political interest captures the broadest dimension of engagement and is likely to be the first step toward greater engagement in politics. Being interested in politics involves very little effort on the part of citizens, and in general, will occur before one decides to discuss politics with others or run for political office. Discussing politics with friends and following politics in the news are expressions of one’s level of political interest and are aspects of engagement that require more time, effort, and self-confidence than merely having an interest in politics. Using all three measures provides a fuller measure of engagement than just one, and it matches conceptualizations of engagement in other studies. We measure these dimensions of political engagement with three questions from the WVS. Discernible gender gaps exist in political engagement around the world and the size of those gaps varies considerably across countries.

Given that these three dimensions tap one concept, we use factor analysis to create an index of political engagement for our dependent variable. The three measures are strongly correlated with one another and load on one dimension. The factor score ranges from −1.9 to 1.8, and Figure 1 shows that the wide variation in gender gaps across countries. The gender gap in political engagement is largest in India and Albania and smallest in Finland and the Philippines.

We hypothesized that three types of power-sharing institutions help explain these gender gaps: proportionality in electoral rules, parliamentary systems, and federalism. We operationalize the proportionality of the electoral system with the least squares index of disproportionality that measures the disparity between the percentage of votes that political parties win and the percentage of seats in the lower or only chamber of the national legislature (Gallagher and Mitchell 2008). It is a continuous variable such that the larger the disparity, the more disproportional the electoral system. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems are the most proportional types of systems while plurality electoral rules yield the most disproportional votes/seats ratio. Specifically, we expect more disproportional systems to discourage engagement, especially women’s engagement relative to men’s. We code the type of government as to whether it is parliamentary “1” or a presidential/mixed system “0.” Finally, federalism is a dichotomous variable with federal systems coded “1” and unitary systems coded “0.”

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3We excluded nondemocracies from our dataset. Nondemocracies are those whose combined rating on Freedom House’s political rights and civil liberties scale of 11 or higher (all “free” and “partially free” countries).

4Verba, Burns, and Schlozman (1995) use these three measures along with measures of political knowledge, efficacy, and sensitivity to political cues. The World Values Survey does not include these variables.

5We include countries for which the World Values Study posed relevant questions and for which we have data on all independent variables included in the regression models below. The total number of countries is 34. Figures separately depicting the gender gaps for political interest, political discussion, and following politics in the news are presented in online Appendices C, D, and E. On all three dimensions of political engagement, women have lower levels of engagement than men in almost every country and the size of the gender gaps varies widely.

6The factor loadings are: interest (.700), discussion (.653), and news (.589). The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.68.

7Gender quotas were instituted quite recently in many systems (in relation to the 2000 WVS), such that insufficient time has passed to properly test the role of quotas in encouraging political engagement, especially women’s engagement. Among the 34 countries in our analyses (online Appendix B) only Argentina, Belgium, France, Peru, and the Philippines had adopted national level quotas before 2000, and not every country held elections under the new quota law before 2000. We have run the models with the additional quota variable and the interaction between quotas and gender. Neither attains statistical significance. However, the models remain virtually unchanged.
Half of the countries in our dataset are parliamentary systems, and half are either presidential democracies (seven cases) or mixed presidential-parliamentary democracies (10 cases). Most countries are unitary systems but ten are federal. Wide variation exists across countries in the proportionality of their electoral systems. The three least proportional (most disproportional) are the United Kingdom, France, and Moldova. The most proportional (least disproportional) are Denmark and South Africa, both of which have index values less than 1.

Of course, factors other than power-sharing institutions may affect citizen engagement. Thus, we also control for several variables that have been found to be important in explaining gender differences in political participation in past research. At the individual level, we expect a respondent’s higher age, income level, education, and marital status to heighten engagement (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). At the country level, the socioeconomic environment, ideology of the government, and women’s political representation may affect citizen engagement. Specifically, we control for the level of economic development (GDP per capita), women’s workforce participation, whether the government is controlled by a leftist party, whether a country has ever had a woman President or Prime Minister, and the percentage of the country’s national legislature that is female (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Karp and Banducci 2008b; Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007).

The data for this study are measured at two distinct levels. Multilevel data structures, such as this, require special modeling techniques that account for the fact that country-level data are constant across all respondents in those countries and to avoid overestimating the significance of the country-level variables. One option is country dummy variables that isolate country-specific effects, but these quickly become onerous when there are a large number of countries (as in our study). Instead, we use hierarchical linear modeling techniques (HLM) that are designed specifically to deal with the nuances of multilevel data (Byrk and Raudenbusch 1992; Kedar and Shively 2005; Steenburgen and Jones 2002).

The Effects of Inclusive Institutions on Political Engagement

Table 1 presents the results of the hierarchical linear models estimating the effect of respondent characteristics, country-level contextual factors, and political
institutions on political engagement.\textsuperscript{9,10} We present three separate models to test our hypotheses.\textsuperscript{11} Model 1 reports the effect of power-sharing institutions on citizen engagement in general, controlling for other factors. This model tests our first hypothesis that institutions directly influence an individual’s engagement, regardless of gender. Model 2 reports the findings of a model with interaction terms between gender and the power-sharing institutions to estimate whether power-sharing institutions have different effects on men’s and women’s engagement. This model tests the crux of our theory. Model 3 includes an interaction term between women’s legislative representation and gender. Recent research has suggested that the increased presence of women in national politics may have a particularly strong effect on women’s political attitudes, engagement, and electoral participation (Atkeson 2003; Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; Reingold and Harrell Forthcoming; Karp and Banducci 2008b; Sapiro and Conover 1997; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007). We include this third model to isolate the direct effects that institutions have on engagement from the indirect role disproportionality may play in increasing the presence of women in legislatures which in turn may affect engagement.

In all three models, individual characteristics significantly predict engagement in the expected directions. Women are less likely to be engaged in politics than men while older, married citizens, and those with higher incomes and education levels are more likely to be politically engaged. In contrast, the noninstitutional characteristics of countries are not statistically significant in either model. Level of economic development (logged GDP per capita),

### Table 1 Explaining Political Engagement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of Respondents</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.332*** (.009)</td>
<td>-.201*** (.020)</td>
<td>-.310*** (.032)</td>
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<td>Age</td>
<td>.009*** (.000)</td>
<td>.009*** (.000)</td>
<td>.009*** (.000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>.084*** (.006)</td>
<td>.084*** (.006)</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>.340*** (.007)</td>
<td>.339*** (.007)</td>
<td>.338*** (.007)</td>
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<td>Married</td>
<td>.086*** (.010)</td>
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<td>Logged GDP per capita</td>
<td>-.000 (.039)</td>
<td>.001 (.039)</td>
<td>.001 (.039)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women in Workforce</td>
<td>.009 (.006)</td>
<td>.009 (.006)</td>
<td>.009 (.006)</td>
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<td>.027 (.062)</td>
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<td>Female Political Executive</td>
<td>-.095 (.109)</td>
<td>-.096 (.109)</td>
<td>-.097 (.109)</td>
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<td>Women in Legislature</td>
<td>-.001 (.006)</td>
<td>-.001 (.006)</td>
<td>-.003 (.007)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parliamentary System</td>
<td>.046 (.099)</td>
<td>.100 (.099)</td>
<td>.101 (.099)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal System</td>
<td>-.108 (.113)</td>
<td>-.078 (.113)</td>
<td>-.063 (.113)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disproportionality</td>
<td>-.023* (.013)</td>
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<td>Gender*Parliamentary</td>
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<td>-.108*** (.018)</td>
<td>-.108*** (.018)</td>
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<td>Gender*Federalism</td>
<td>-.060*** (.019)</td>
<td>-.092*** (.020)</td>
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<td>Gender*Disproportionality</td>
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<td>Gender*Women in Legislature</td>
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<td>.005*** (.001)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-1.316*** (.473)</td>
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<td>.266 (.038)</td>
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<td>Chi-squared</td>
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</table>

Maximum restricted likelihood estimates followed by standard errors in parentheses.

\textsuperscript{9}Models estimated with OLS and clustered standard errors yield similar results (Franzese 2005; Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007).

\textsuperscript{10}The exclusion of two potential outliers, India and Albania, does not change our findings.

\textsuperscript{11}We also ran a set of models for each component of the engagement factor score. For interest and discussion, the findings are similar to what is presented in Table 1. The findings are less robust for following politics in the news.
women’s workforce participation, leftist governments, female chief executives, and the proportion of women in the legislature appear to have little independent effect on political engagement. The economic finding in particular supports what Desposato and Norrander (2008) find in Latin America.

Among the direct effects of power-sharing institutions, proportionality in the electoral rules affects political engagement for the electorate. As Model 1 shows, disproportionality has a dampening effect on citizen engagement. A one-unit increase in disproportionality leads to a 0.023-unit decrease in the political engagement index. To illustrate the size of this effect more clearly, consider a comparison between the most proportional system in our dataset (South Africa) and the least proportional (France). The two countries represent a difference of 17 points on the disproportionality index. According to Model 1, this 17-point difference would correspond to approximately a 0.4-point difference, all else equal, on the political engagement scale that ranges from −1.9 to 1.8. While not huge, a shift from −1.9 to −1.5 or 0.5 to 0.9 does indicate a notable increase in political engagement. In contrast to the significant effect of disproportionality, neither of the other two power-sharing institutions affects levels of political engagement among citizens. Parliamentary systems do not yield greater political engagement than presidential or mixed systems, and federal systems do not have higher levels of engagement among citizens than unitary systems.

Model 1 suggests a relationship between disproportionality and citizen engagement, but is the effect equally important for both men and women or does a more proportional system produce a particularly strong effect for women, as we hypothesized above? Model 2 analyzes whether power-sharing institutions have different effects on men and women, and through those effects, reduce the size of the gender gap in political engagement across countries. Model 2 suggests that all three power-sharing institutions have significantly different effects on men and women, indicated by the statistically significant interaction terms (Kam and Franzese 2007). However, it is impossible to tell from the interaction term itself what substantive effects the institutional variables have on engagement and whether they have statistically significant effects on both men’s engagement and women’s engagement (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). To determine this, we calculate the marginal (or conditional) effects and conditional standard errors for different power-sharing institutions on men’s engagement (Gender = 1) and women’s engagement (Gender = 0). The first three rows of Table 2 present the effect that each institution has on men’s engagement and women’s engagement and whether or not those effects are statistically significant.

First, the table shows that neither the use of a parliamentary system nor federalism increases men’s engagement or women’s engagement. This mirrors the null findings presented in the first model of Table 2 for parliamentarism and federalism. Not only do they not affect citizen engagement in general, but they do not have a significant effect on women’s or men’s engagement. While Norris (2008) found these two power-sharing institutions to matter for ethnic minorities, the theoretical link between parliamentary government and federalism does not appear to translate into a comparable effect for gender.

As expected, however, disproportionality does have a statistically significant effect on women’s engagement that is also significantly different than its effect on men’s engagement. This provides support for our hypothesis that institutions that symbolize social group power sharing can enhance women’s engagement more than men’s. Table 2 shows that more disproportional electoral systems decrease women’s engagement by a statistically significant 0.027 points. Disproportionality also dampens men’s engagement, but the −0.019 effects is only significant at the p = 0.13 level so we cannot be as confident that disproportionality affects political engagement levels for men. Not only does disproportionality significantly decrease women’s engagement, it has a significantly different effect on women’s engagement.

12We interpret the interaction term and its constituent terms together to show the effect of each power-sharing institution for men and for women. The conditional effects (b) represent the effect that a one-unit change in the institutional variable has on political engagement when Gender = 0 (men) and when it equals 1 (women).

13We ran the analyses in STATA 10 with the xtmixed command, and used the lincom postestimation command to estimate marginal effects and conditional standard errors.

14Although the interaction terms in are significant, this only means that that the difference in the effect that parliamentarism and federalism have on women’s and men’s engagement is statistically significant not that the institutional variables actually have a statistically significant effect on women’s engagement or men’s engagement. For example, the effect of parliamentarism on women’s engagement is −0.003 and its effect on men’s engagement is 0.100. Neither of these effects is statistically significant, but the 0.13 difference in those effects is significant (as indicated by the significant interaction term in Table 1). Thus, the marginal effects and conditional standard errors in Table 2 reveal that these two power-sharing institutions do not significantly increase women’s or men’s engagement, even though the difference between the effects is large enough to be significant.
than men's (difference = 0.08) as seen from the significance of the interaction term in Table 1.

Figure 2 illustrates this finding for disproportionality graphically.\(^{15} \) The figure shows that the effect of disproportionality on engagement is larger for women than for men. The slope for the line that represents women declines more precipitously than the line for men. The size of the difference is substantively small, however, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis at all levels of disproportionality. We can be most confident that women's and men's engagement levels are different when disproportionality is at its mean (7.57) and least confident at the extremes (minimum = 0.28 and maximum = 22.45). The majority of countries in our dataset fall between 3 and 11 on the index of disproportionality, meaning that we can be confident about the differential effects of disproportionality for men and women in most cases.

One potentially confounding influence on women's engagement is women’s legislative representation. As mentioned previously, the presence of women in legislative office indicates greater inclusion of women into the political process and could lead to higher levels of political engagement. Thus, it is necessary to include a control for the interactive effect that gender and women’s legislative representation may have on political engagement to ensure that the findings for the institutional variables remain robust. Model 3 of Table 1 shows that inclusion of the gender and women’s representation interaction is statistically significant suggesting that the presence of women in legislatures does have a significantly different effect on men and women. It also shows that including this interaction decreases the significance of the gender and disproportionality interaction term (\( p = 0.12 \), although only slightly. Again, we must examine the marginal effects and conditional standard errors to determine how strong the effects are and whether they are significant for men and women. Table 2 reports these calculations and shows that women’s legislative representation does not significantly affect men’s or women’s engagement.\(^{16} \) Although the interaction term in the multivariate model of Table 1 (Model 3) suggests that it may matter, calculating the marginal effects and conditional standard errors at the observed values of the Gender variable (0 and 1) reveals that women’s legislative representation does not significantly influence women’s engagement or men’s engagement. Disproportionality, however, persists in having a significant effect on women’s and men’s engagement. The difference in the effect that disproportionality has on men and women is smaller (0.004), but according to the interaction term in Model 3 of Table 1, still near statistical significance. Women’s legislative representation does not eliminate the positive role that more proportional electoral systems have on women’s engagement.

\(^{15} \) We follow Kam and Fransese (2007: Appendix B) for this figure. We generated the predicted \( y \) for a “typical” man and “typical” woman in our dataset at different levels of proportionality, holding gender at 0 and 1, letting disproportionality and the interaction term vary, and holding all other variables constant at their means or modes.

\(^{16} \) The marginal effect (\( b \)) is the predicted effect that that increasing the percentage of women in the legislature by one percentage point will have on political engagement when the Gender variable = 0 (men) and when it equals 1 (women). The conditional standard error (se) in parentheses corresponds to the marginal effect and indicates whether the effect is statistically significant at these observed values of the Gender variable (0 or 1).
This finding supports our theory that the proportionality of electoral rules symbolizes inclusiveness and representativeness and has a direct effect on women’s political engagement. The effect of proportionality on women’s engagement does not occur through high levels of women’s legislative representation but instead occurs as a direct result of the power-sharing signals that proportional representation electoral systems send to citizens. Our null finding for the percentage of women in the legislatures supports the weak or null findings that other scholars have reported (Lawless 2004; Karp and Banducci 2008b) underscoring the need for more research on the conditions under which women’s legislative presence affects citizens. Our research suggests that scholars may need to take into account the direct effect that institutions may have on engagement rather than assuming that they have only an indirect role in the process. More proportional electoral rules can be symbols of inclusiveness and representation and increase women’s political engagement.

Conclusions

Scholars have long-viewed institutions as important determinants of political outcomes. Yet, only recently has research linked institutions to mass attitudes and behavior and most of it has done so by emphasizing the rational incentives that institutions provide for behavior. In this paper, we articulate a theory that emphasizes the symbolic effects that institutions have and argue that power-sharing institutions send signals about the inclusiveness of the political system that make citizens more likely to engage in politics. Further, we suggest that certain institutions may have a particularly strong effect on long-underrepresented groups, such as women. We test this theory empirically and find that more proportional electoral rules signal inclusion and representativeness, encouraging citizen engagement, generally, and most saliently for women as a historically politically marginalized and less engaged group. Further, we can be most confident about the differential effect of proportionality on men and women along the range of values of Gallagher’s disproportionality index where a majority of countries fall, rather than at the extremes of proportionality or disproportionality, where few countries lie.

The seminal research of Lijphart (1999), Powell (2000), and Norris (2008) identifies several different sets of power-sharing institutions. We find, however, that only one of the three most prominent power-sharing institutions affects engagement—the proportionality of electoral rules. Parliamentarism and federalism, which symbolize horizontal power sharing among the executive and legislature and geographic or vertical power sharing, respectively, do not affect citizen engagement or women’s engagement, more specifically. Although theory suggests that each of these institutions could affect engagement, the null findings for parliamentarism and federalism are not overly surprising for two reasons. First, Lijphart, Powell, and Norris all argue that the nature of the electoral system is perhaps the most important power-sharing institution. Indeed, most of Powell’s (2000) book focuses on the electoral system. Second, while all three institutions promote power sharing, they do so in different ways. Electoral rules do so by emphasizing inclusion of more diverse groups, which sends direct signals to the citizenry that they should get more engaged, while the others emphasize power sharing across government, which may send signals to political elites that only indirectly reach the masses or send signals to groups that are geographically based (which women are not). Indeed, one unique feature of federalism is that it is rooted in the representation of territorially based interests. Elkins and Sides (2007) show that the effects of federalism on citizens’ attachment to the state depends upon the density of minority groups residing in particular geographic areas. While federalism may lead to greater engagement among geographically concentrated underrepresented groups, our findings show that its effects are not applicable to all citizens or specific to women. This underscores a point increasingly being made in the literature on underrepresented groups—women and ethnic minorities are both underrepresented groups in politics but should not be theorized to think or act in the same ways in response to political stimuli (Htun 2004).

The findings of our research also have several important implications for research on institutions, women’s representation, and citizen engagement. First, they suggest that electoral institutions are an important, but often overlooked, component to explaining gender differences in political behavior. Previous research on gender has tended to focus on socioeconomic explanations for variations in citizens’ attitudes and behavior. However, these explanations have not fully accounted for differences across countries. Many economically developed countries still have large disparities between men’s and women’s political engagement that cannot be explained with current theories of political behavior. We show that electoral institutions help to fill that gap. By
encouraging inclusion, a more proportional vision of democracy hastens change in enduring cultural legacies of the role of men and women in politics.

Second, our findings show that electoral institutions send signals of power sharing and inclusiveness and matter above and beyond the presence of women in legislatures for explaining women’s political engagement. In some countries, proportional rules correlate with having more women in office, but even where they do not, more proportional systems still send signals of inclusiveness that get women more interested in politics, more likely to follow politics in the news, and more likely to discuss politics with friends. Democratic institutions themselves appear to be strong symbols of inclusiveness.

This research not only articulates a theory of the symbolic incentives that institutions can provide for citizen engagement but finds empirical support for the argument that institutions offer more than rational incentives to engage in politics. Democratic institutions provide symbolic cues to citizens about a country’s most important democratic ideals—cues that can alter the way they perceive the system and respond to it. Where electoral institutions signal and mobilize broad representation and inclusion in the political process, citizen engagement is more extensive. While the rational incentives that institutions provide should not be overlooked, neither should the symbolic effects nor psychological incentives. Institutions are powerful features of political systems that shape mass attitudes and behavior.

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References


Miki Caul Kittilson is Associate Professor of Political Science, School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University, P.O. Box 873902, Tempe, AZ 85287-3902.

Leslie Schwindt-Bayer is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri, 103 Professional Building, Columbia, MO 65211.